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10 Every country in the world has some form of law
11 relating to its cultural heritage. These range from
12 the draconian (and sometimes relatively ineffec-
13 tive: Cleere 1984: 130) to the more loosely for-
14 mulated and generally respected. In between lies
15 the majority, more or less complex and more or
16 less complied with. Some are “homegrown” and
17 reflect particular local circumstances; others else-
18 where are copied from neighboring or more dis-
19 tant places; others again have been adopted from
20 past rulers but remain in place nonetheless. Law
21 has been very important to the development of
22 the idea of preserving material from the past
23 (Carman 2012): laws have always proved a key
24 means by which that preservation was effected.
25 Laws also serve to legitimize the idea of that
26 preservation.
27 This entry will look at the different kinds of
28 laws that apply to the material heritage in differ-
29 ent parts of the world and how they operate. In
30 doing so, it is an exploration and celebration of
31 difference rather than similarity. The common
32thread, however, lies in the adoption of law – of
33whatever kind and however written – as the key
34method of dealing with the cultural heritage. It
35has been the promulgation of laws to preserve old
36things – whatever the motivation driving it – that
37turns a mere private or sectional interest into
38something like heritage management as we
39know it. In the current state of heritage manage-
40ment, laws are even more crucial to the preserva-
41tion of our heritage: without them, it can be
42cogently argued, there is no heritage (Cleere
431989: 10). At the same time, these laws need to
44be overseen and put into effect by appropriately
45empowered agents, whether of the state or inde-
46pendent. These agents too have their powers and
47duties defined by the laws that govern them and
48the material on which they act. Accordingly, even
49in so-called “non-statutory” systems of heritage
50management, law is the underlying mechanism
51and the ultimate repository of authority.
52The sections of this entry will offer introduc-
53tory outlines to some of the forms which laws in
54this area can take, how they are organized and to
55be interpreted, and the relations between laws at
56the national and international level. The opening
57section will examine some of the justifications for
58laws in this area, a truly global discourse.
59A section on interpretation of laws will expose
60the clear differences that exist between legal sys-
61tems and which necessarily affect our under-
62standing of them and any attempt at
63international comparison: these include the legal
64structures of federal versus unitary states, laws
65derived from traditions of Roman (and other)
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66 law, and those grounded in English “Common
67 Law.” An overview of international regulation –
68 global in nature but subject to interpretation at the
69 national level – follows. The laws of national
70 territories will then come under scrutiny,
71 representing different systems of laws: those
72 assuming the state to be the proper owner of
73 material versus those where private ownership
74 is held to be the ideal, those favoring direct inter-
75 vention and control versus more indirect and
76 administrative mechanisms, and so on. Overall,
77 the paradox of the ubiquity of laws to achieve the
78 same ends that take a remarkably diverse set of
79 forms will become clear. A final section will
80 review the effect the promulgation of legislative
81 control has had on the field in terms of the devel-
82 opment of professional agendas and associations,
83 both national and international, and the ways
84 these too regulate the practice of heritage
85 management.
86 This aspect of heritage management is very
87 well documented. This is partly inevitable: laws
88 are usually written documents and to ensure com-
89 pliance must be made widely available to their
90 intended audience. The literature of heritage
91 management, therefore, abounds with summaries
92 and commentaries at the national level (for the
93 UK, see Carman 1996; Pugh-Smith & Samuels
94 1996; Hunter & Ralston 2007; for the USA, US
95 Dept. of the Interior 1989-90; for France,
96 Rigambert 1996; for Austria, Hocke 1975; for
97 German states, Do¨rge 1971; Eberl et al. 1975;
98 for Switzerland, Hangartner 1981; for Mexico,
99 King et al. 1980; etc.) and at the international
100 and comparative level (Burnham 1974; Prott &
101 O’Keefe 1984; Cleere 1984; Carman 2002:
102 68-76; and on underwater archaeology
103 Dromgoole 1999).
104 The Role of Law
105 Despite the ubiquity of legislation as
106 a foundational tool of heritage management prac-
107 tice, very little of the literature of the field con-
108 cerns the purpose of such laws or, to put it another
109 way, explains why we pass laws on this matter
110 rather than tackling it in another way. McGimsey
111 (1972), for instance, argues powerfully for legis-
112 lation as a key component of a state preservation
113program but also argues against legislation alone
114since it would be an entirely “negative approach”
115(McGimsey 1972: 33 & 46) lacking the necessary
116support from the wider public. Prott and O’Keefe
117(1984) go further: they argue that the dangers
118facing the archaeological resource are ever
119greater and that accordingly “some of them can
120only be controlled by governments” and therefore
121require legislation (Prott & O’Keefe 1984: 13).
122At the same time, they recognize the valuable
123role laws play in resolving key conflicts over
124material – especially issues of ownership
125and control – and the setting of policy aims, as
126well as the increasing requirements of national
127governments to comply with international
128treaties concerning the heritage (Prott &
129O’Keefe 1984: 14). None of these is, however,
130a reason for law as such: both McGimsey and
131Prott and O’Keefe offer programs of public
132education and the mustering of political support
133as alternatives (McGimsey 1972: 29-31; Prott &
134O’Keefe 1984: 145-15).
135In so far as McGimsey does provide a reason
136for legislation, it must be as part of the requisite
137“administrative structure” (McGimsey 1972: 27)
138for such a program, which includes its establish-
139ment as a legally recognized authority with its
140own budget. Pickard (2001: 4-10), reviewing
141a sample of European states with a view to their
142response to new international agreements on cul-
143tural heritage, expands on this theme by
144presenting a number of areas where legislation
145has a valuable defining role:
146• Of definition of the heritage, concerning the
147attributes and characteristics a heritage object
148should have or be deemed to possess
149• Of identification of the heritage, especially the
150means available of inventory and recording,
151and the making of lists and schedules
152• Of preservation and protection of the heritage,
153whether through systems of designation or by
154regulating development
155• Of the philosophy of conservation in place,
156including attitudes to restoration and
157reconstruction
158• Of appropriate sanctions against breaches of
159the law and the means – coercive or other-
160wise – to encourage compliance
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161 • Of the integration of cultural preservation with
162 other government policies and imperatives
163 • Of financial aspects
164 • Of the specific powers and duties of govern-
165 ment and nongovernmental agencies in
166 respect of the heritage
167 • Of educational and other aspects
168 From this functionalist perspective, the law in
169 this area can be seen not so much as a mechanism
170 of heritage management but as a facilitator for
171 systems of heritage management to come into
172 being: on its own, it seems, law does nothing
173 but requires other agencies in order to put heri-
174 tage management into effect. This is perhaps one
175 reason law should so often emerge first in systems
176 of heritage management: it provides the frame-
177 work on which the other aspects of heritage man-
178 agement can hang. On the other hand, it would
179 seem that other components of a heritage man-
180 agement system could exist independently of leg-
181 islation to put them into place. The question “why
182 law?” remains.
183 Although in general sympathetic to heritage
184 management as a practice (and whatever they
185 may choose to call it), others have taken a more
186 critical view of the role of law in this field.
187 A study of English law in this area (Carman
188 1996) concluded that its main purpose was to
189 give value to archaeological remains. Though
190 a continually reductive process of selection of
191 certain kinds of object from all the things in the
192 world, subsequent categorization of those things
193 into legal terms and allocation to particular agen-
194 cies for a limited range of treatments, archaeo-
195 logical sites, and monuments would emerge with
196 a new meaning and a new set of values placed
197 upon them. In doing so, they became officially
198 recognized as important and worthy of protection
199 and preservation. This is a reversal of the usual
200 understanding of the sequence, whereby things
201 that are important are chosen to be preserved by
202 law: here, it is the law that makes certain things
203 important. A similar view was reached in respect
204 of legislation to govern the heritage of indigenous
205 populations in Australia and the USA (Smith
206 2004: 125-155). As Smith puts it, legislation
207 “plays a key role in the management of Indige-
208 nous material culture, as. . . it establishes the need
209for management procedures and processes”
210(Smith 2004: 125). Such law therefore goes on
211to define who will manage indigenous culture and
212how those involved – archaeologists, indigenous
213people, and government agencies – will interact.
214This means law sets “the parameters of accept-
215able management practice. . ..[and] the scope of
216policy debate, and influences the way in which
217debate is conducted between the three actors”
218(Smith 2004: 125). Overall, “legislation provides
219governments and bureaucracies with terms, con-
220cepts and guidelines against which competing
221claims to material culture may be assessed”
222(Smith 2004: 126) and ultimately “provides the
223conceptual frameworks that must govern debates
224within” heritage management which “institution-
225alize and regulate the discipline [of archaeology]
226as a technology of government” (Smith 2004:
227154). Similarly, Fourmile (1996) has reviewed
228the role of Australian legislation in denying the
229indigenous population any access to or control
230over their cultural heritage. These readings of the
231place of legislation in heritage management
232locate it at the service of requirements external
233to the discipline itself and closer to those of
234government. In other words, rather than law serv-
235ing the needs of archaeology, archaeology is
236made to serve the needs of government.
237Interestingly, however, it is not just those who
238are critical (or indeed suspicious) of law who see
239it in this light. Breeze (1996) – writing on the
240definition given in Scotland to the British legis-
241lative category of “national monument” – is clear
242that the purpose is “to ensure that all people have
243access to [Scotland’s built] heritage [of all
244periods] and are able to enjoy it, regardless of
245their own origins and background” (Breeze 1996:
246102). He also acknowledges that “preserving
247monuments. . . is not entirely an end in itself”
248and cites government reasoning behind it (Breeze
2491996: 102). Accordingly, the idea of a “national”
250archaeological resource based in law is seen here
251not as a limiting and exclusive concept but
252nevertheless one that remains at the service
253of government agendas. This same idea is
254reflected in Knudson’s (1986) review of cultural
255resource management practice in the USA. As
256a result of success in “persuading the major
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257 policymakers. . . of the public significance of
258 archaeological resources. . .. the implementation
259 of such policies will not leave anyone. . . out of
260 the process of public accountability for the treat-
261 ment of those resources,” and “this will be
262 conducted within the context of multiple public
263 objectives” (Knudson 1986: 399). The public
264 referred to here is taken to be the Euro-American
265 population of the USA, excluding its indigenous
266 population whose cultural works are under dis-
267 cussion. Accordingly, even though it is acknowl-
268 edged that conservation of cultural remains is
269 a globally endorsed project, the target of conser-
270 vation practice in the USA and what flows from it
271 is directed at a particular audience, at least partly
272 the result of “a lack of genetic continuity between
273 the dominant political community in the United
274 States and prehistoric Americans” (Knudson
275 1986: 396). Here, as elsewhere, law drives the
276 heritage management process rather than provid-
277 ing support for it.
278 In most writing on heritage management,
279 a legislative basis for preservation practice is
280 taken for granted. The literature is therefore for
281 the most part descriptive rather than critically
282 discursive and does not ask why laws are in
283 place in such profusion. One reason is simply
284 historical: it is “the way it is done.” Other reasons
285 emerge from a closer reading, however, whether
286 from an overtly critical or a more sympathetic
287 perspective: laws serve, as it turns out, not the
288 needs of heritage management but rather
289 the agencies – and in particular national govern-
290 ments – who promote them. This is not an issue of
291 effectiveness, but may have an impact on the way
292 heritage management is done in different
293 contexts.
294 How to Approach, Read, and Interpret Laws
295 Laws are technical documents rather than discur-
296 sive texts, which means they are not only written
297 in a particular way but also designed to be read in
298 a certain way (see, e.g., for the USA, Dickerson
299 1975; for the UK, Cross 1995; for Italy, Tarello
300 1980; for international comparisons,
301 MacCormick & Summers 1991). Indeed, “read-
302 ing” in its conventional everyday sense may not
303 be quite the right word: they are usually designed
304to be used more like a technical manual than read
305as a linear narrative. Moreover, the particular
306manner in which such texts should be read varies
307from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so that an ability
308to operate in one legal system does not automat-
309ically imply an ability to so operate in a different
310one. The aim of this section is to outline some of
311the ways in which laws relevant to archaeology
312can vary from country to country across the
313globe.
314As I have argued elsewhere (Carman 1996:
31517; 2002: 102-103), to have a truly meaningful
316comparison between the practices of archaeolog-
317ical heritage management, it is necessary to take
318three factors into account:
319• Differences between legal and regulatory
320systems
321• Differences in the nature of the material record
322of the past between one territory and another
323• Differences in the traditions and historical
324development of archaeology between one ter-
325ritory and the other
326The first of these covers such things as the
327basic assumptions relating to the interests to be
328served by law, the degree of appropriate state
329control held to be applicable in an area, the
330weight to be given to private property laws, or
331the expected powers and duties of state and other
332agencies. All of these will differ between one
333territory and another, or one legal system (e.g.,
334Common or Roman) and another. In the UK or
335USA, for instance, the usual style is to provide for
336legal protection without taking material directly
337into state ownership, but in other territories all
338archaeological remains and other heritage objects
339are held to be the property of the state. In the UK,
340the USA, and Australia, this reflects the ideolog-
341ical authority of private property upheld by
342a system of Common Law, as against the author-
343ity of the state more typical of systems deriving
344from the European continent. Here, the difference
345lies in expectations of what is right and proper
346and more fundamental social values. Where it is
347expected that heritage objects should belong to
348the state, the kind of system operated in the UK or
349USA makes no sense; in the UK or USA, the
350adoption of a system of generalized state owner-
351ship would be seen as an attack on private
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352 property. An attempt to assess the merits of one
353 system against another therefore runs up against
354 these fundamental differences in understanding
355 of what laws can and should do and to whom
356 legal authority should be given.
357 The second and third factors are linked. They
358 concern the nature of the archaeological record
359 and how it inevitably differs in different terri-
360 tories and the understanding given to the purpose
361 and focus of archaeological research which will
362 differ in one country from another, so that very
363 different research traditions may exist, leading to
364 a differential emphasis on types of material. In
365 the UK, for instance, the treatment of different
366 types of material is very often the same regardless
367 of physical form or age. Prehistoric structures in
368 the countryside can be treated in exactly the same
369 way as medieval ruins in a city, and ancient
370 monuments (a legal category that in England
371 now includes some material from the twentieth
372 century) can be placed upon a schedule, while
373 standing buildings can be placed upon a list, both
374 of which offer some form of legal protection.
375 There are other territories, however, where dif-
376 ferences in age make a substantial difference.
377 Material from a preliterate past may be treated
378 very differently from material emanating from
379 historical times, or one period of history – or
380 material representing a particular way of life –
381 may be more highly valued than another, making
382 one subject to legal control and protection, while
383 the other is abandoned to its fate. In the USA, for
384 instance, buried remains of the indigenous popu-
385 lation are subject to forms of federal legal control,
386 while the remains of (sometimes contemporary)
387 colonizing Europeans are excluded from this cov-
388 erage. Such differences will make any direct
389 comparison of UK and US laws rather meaning-
390 less, since they are grounded in very different
391 historical circumstances, are driven by very dif-
392 ferent political and cultural imperatives, and con-
393 cern significantly different categories of person.
394 At root, therefore, UK and US legislation in this
395 area do not concern the same types of material.
396 Any set of national laws will also need to be
397 read in accordance with specific standards. These
398 “rules of construction” are quite precise and are
399 often themselves enshrined in law, ensuring that
400any law of the particular state will be interpreted
401in the same way as any other and thus guarantee
402consistency in application. These rules do not,
403however, cross territorial and jurisdictional
404boundaries. A brief introduction to some of the
405key differences that can exist is set out by Prott &
406O’Keefe (1984: 150-151) and another by
407Summers and Taruffo (1991: 501), but for
408specific advice on how to read laws in particular
409jurisdictions, more precise legal guidance needs
410to be sought. In particular, there are gross differ-
411ences between the manner of interpreting laws
412between systems of legal Codes and the princi-
413ples of Common Law. All start from the premise
414that laws are written and composed of words: the
415question arises as to how to understand the mean-
416ing and intent behind certain words and phrases.
417Codification of Law: France
418As conveniently summarized by Troper et al.
419(1991: 171), a distinguishing feature of French
420legal culture is that it is “one of written law. . .. to
421a large extent codified.” The effect of codification
422is to offer a body of law that is complete and
423contains no contradictions or elisions: it therefore
424does not allow opportunities for avoidance or
425evasion, or for circumstances that are not covered
426by it. Accordingly, where the law is silent on an
427issue, it becomes the task of interpreters to fill
428that silence: either by simply not recognizing the
429omission or – more likely – by recognizing that
430the “gap” in legal coverage is a result of the
431legislator’s inability to think of everything in
432advance and thus prevailing upon the interpreter
433to do so (Troper et al. 1991: 175-176). It is gen-
434erally assumed that the legislators intend all
435laws to comply with the Constitution, and so
436laws will be interpreted to ensure this (Troper
437et al. 1991: 195), and that the administration
438works for the good of the common interest
439(Troper et al. 1991: 196) although laws restricting
440liberties are interpreted more strictly (Troper
441et al. 1991: 202).
442Although as elsewhere in the world (see
443below) interpreters seek the “true” meaning of
444a law and the intention of the lawmaker, the
445materials they are allowed to draw upon
446are very wide rather than being constrained
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447 (as elsewhere) by tight legal rules (Troper et al.
448 1991: 184-189). These may include:
449 • The historical background to the law
450 • Documents used in drafting the law, including
451 drafts and consultations
452 • Interpretations by users of the law, especially
453 public officials
454 • The language of other, related, laws
455 • The language of laws amended by the one in
456 question
457 • The history of legal terminology
458 • The effect particular interpretations would
459 have in terms of the national Constitution or
460 international treaty obligations
461 • Customary procedures and practices that
462 would otherwise be affected
463 Interestingly, especially for comparison with
464 the USA and UK (see below), interpretations by
465 other courts are rarely drawn upon, although
466 those of superior courts within the same hierarchy
467 may be.
468 Overall, French law is seen as a unity that
469 governs all those it rules. Interpreters of law –
470 that is, the courts – are seen not at all to make law
471 but simply to seek the lawmaker’s intention.
472 Accordingly, in filling “gaps” not covered by
473 a specific legal phraseology, they are seen only
474 to be expressing the will and intent of the legis-
475 lator rather than making new law or extending its
476 coverage. All laws are interpreted in the light of
477 the overarching Code of which they are a part: it
478 follows that no French law “stands alone” but
479 must be read as part of a coherent and cohesive
480 system that effectively recognizes no differences
481 of status or standing or of exception. As Summers
482 and Taruffo (1991: 501) see it, in French law
483 there are no genuine issues of interpretation, and
484 only one meaning is ever possible, and it is this
485 that interpreters must seek.
486 A Federal Common Law State: The USA
487 The French case is very different from that of the
488 USA. While France is a single state, the USA is
489 a federal one, divided into 50 jurisdictions
490 governed by a federal Constitution. All laws of
491 every state and federal law (a jurisdiction in
492 itself) must ultimately comply with the Constitu-
493 tion: as in France, compliance will generally be
494assumed unless demonstrated otherwise (Sum-
495mers 1991: 443-444). In the case where a state
496law is in conflict with a federal law, the federal
497law prevails, but a statute will prevail over
498administrative regulation and usually the Com-
499mon Law which underpins all law (Summers
5001991: 444-445). Whereas in French law gaps in
501legal coverage are acknowledged, in the USA
502such gaps are generally treated as if they are
503simple matters of textual interpretation (Sum-
504mers 1991: 411-412): the issue is one of particu-
505lar words and their meanings rather than attempts
506to meet the standards of an overarching Code.
507The materials that a US court may draw upon
508in making interpretations are at once wider than
509that in other territories and more tightly regu-
510lated. Materials that must be taken into account
511include:
512• The language of the text and any titles, sub-
513headings, and other terms relating directly to it
514(compare with the UK, below)
515• Dictionaries and grammars which set out the
516“ordinary” meanings of words under
517examination
518• Any legal definitions of terms
519• The text of other related statutes
520• Any prior, repealed, or modified laws
521• Any official history of the passage of the law
522• Particular historical circumstances the law
523was intended to address, which may now
524have altered
525• General legal principles
526• Interpretations by similar or higher courts
527• Interpretations by officials chargedwith admin-
528istering the law (Summers 1991: 422-427)
529In addition, interpreters are expected (but not
530required) to take into account interpretations by
531other (nonofficial) users of the law, by courts in
532other jurisdictions, and those of senior legal aca-
533demics. There are also materials expressly for-
534bidden from consideration, such as the testimony
535of legislators as to what they believed the law to
536be and nonofficial documentation relating to the
537history of the legislation.
538By contrast especially with France, the US
539system is one that openly acknowledges the pos-
540sibility of alternative readings of legal texts
541(Summers & Taruffo 1991: 501). It follows that
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542 US courts have more of a lawmaking role than
543 their French counterparts. The prior interpreta-
544 tion by other courts has also a much more impor-
545 tant role here than is evident in the French
546 system, and the authority of officials over legal
547 interpretation is much less evident. Similarly, no
548 requirement exists to make the law fit part of a
549 broader code despite the overarching commit-
550 ment to constitutionality.
551 A Unitary Common Law State: The UK
552 The role of the courts in the UK is not to make law
553 but, similar to their role in France, only to inter-
554 pret it. Accordingly, it is not the place of the
555 courts to fill gaps in coverage but to leave this to
556 legislators (Bankowski & MacCormick 1991:
557 362). The law is not codified, and therefore, in
558 large measure, each piece of legislation stands
559 alone and separate from others except where con-
560 nections are expressly drawn (Bankowski &
561 MacCormick 1991: 363): the focus of interpreta-
562 tion is therefore very much upon the strict inter-
563 pretation of particular words and phrases rather
564 than seeking to contextualize the whole
565 (Bankowski&MacCormick 1991: 382). Interpre-
566 tation is therefore an essentially pragmatic pro-
567 cess of seeking the “ordinary signification” of
568 words (Bankowski & MacCormick 1991: 382-
569 386) rather than being driven by broader princi-
570 ple, as in France, or constitutionality, as in the
571 USA. Nevertheless, there are certain underlying
572 presumptions that guide the interpretive process:
573 that absurdity is not an intent of legislators; that
574 laws are designed to operate fairly; that laws do
575 not (unless specifically indicating otherwise)
576 operate retrospectively; and that existing laws
577 remain unaffected unless the law specifically
578 indicates otherwise (Bankowski & MacCormick
579 1991: 391-2). In the UK system, statutes will
580 prevail over all other kinds of law but increasingly
581 need to comply with laws made elsewhere, in
582 particular EU legislation and certain international
583 treaties (Bankowski & MacCormick 1991: 375).
584 As in the USA, interpreters may draw on cer-
585 tain materials, may use others or are barred from
586 using others: however, the range of materials
587 differs from that elsewhere. The primary source
588 is the specific substantive language of the law
589itself, excluding any subheadings, titles, or mar-
590ginal commentary which is only present to guide
591users to relevant texts and not to determine its
592meaning (Cross 1995) but including any “Inter-
593pretation” section which sets out the precise
594meanings certain words and phrases may carry.
595Any previous interpretation by a similar or higher
596court must also be drawn upon, together with any
597relevant subsidiary legislation which may bring
598the law into force (Bankowski & MacCormick
5991991: 375). They may (but are not required) to
600refer to other laws on the same topic, government
601guides on good practice, any previous legal his-
602tory of the terms, current usages of officials, and
603scholarly writings (Bankowski & MacCormick
6041991: 376-380). Material expressly barred from
605consideration includes any information on the
606history of the law and economic or sociological
607data on the effects of particular readings
608(Bankowski & MacCormick 1991: 380-382).
609In general, UK law is seen as a body of sepa-
610rate regulations, some of which stand entirely
611alone, and others which are grouped together,
612and are interpreted accordingly. Although gen-
613eral principles and assumptions guide the pro-
614cess, the focus is very much upon the specifics
615of individual provisions rather than the creation
616of a unified whole. Only those materials directly
617relevant to the point at issue are taken into
618account: extrinsic factors are barred because the
619courts would then be involved in making policy,
620which is not their role. The assumption – as in
621France – is that there is a single meaning lying
622behind a particular provision and the function of
623interpretation is to find it.
624Differences in Reading Laws
625These three examples offer a taste – albeit a small
626one – of how different sets of laws represent
627different legal ideologies and are therefore to be
628read differently from one another. In particular,
629the clear differences between laws that operate as
630part of a codified system and those that stand
631alone need to be taken into account, as do the
632specific materials that can be drawn upon for
633interpretation and those that cannot and the extent
634to which underlying principles regarding the
635presence of “gaps,” absurdity, and contradiction
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636 may be applied. Although Summers and Taruffo
637 (1991) take France and the USA as exemplary of
638 opposed legal systems, here I have used them
639 merely as examples, placed alongside a third, to
640 illustrate diversity. An area not mentioned here
641 has been international law, which is the topic of
642 the next section.
643 International Laws and Their Coverage
644 Technically those materials referred to by (espe-
645 cially but not exclusively) heritage practitioners
646 as “international law” in the field of heritage are
647 not in fact law: rather, for the most part, they are
648 sets of agreements between nation states whereby
649 those states agree to a common standard of treat-
650 ment for certain classes of object, either generally
651 or in defined sets of circumstances. They may be
652 agreements that are designed to operate globally –
653 such as those promulgated by the United Nations
654 or UNESCO – or regionally, such as those relat-
655 ing to Europe or the Americas. These laws are
656 important in the field because they are taken to
657 represent the global principles to which all those
658 concerned with the heritage subscribe. Increas-
659 ingly they are also taken as the basis for the
660 passage of law at the national level. The main
661 international laws in force at present are set out
662 in Table 1.
663 Since they are promulgated by organizations
664 composed of individual nation states, these inter-
665 national agreements are binding only upon the
666 states acceding to them: they cannot be enforced
667 against individuals or agencies unless they have
668 also been incorporated into national laws,
669 although this does not lift the responsibility
670 from national governments to put in place appro-
671 priate arrangements to ensure compliance below
672 the level of government. They are to be read and
673 interpreted in a distinctive manner which reflects
674 in many ways their purpose as setters of norms
675 and guidance. Each such document begins with
676 a preamble which sets out the conditions under
677 which it was brought into existence and the pur-
678 pose it serves: its specific provisions must be read
679 in the light of these opening statements as to
680 function rather than as stand-alone imperatives.
681 This contrasts with the way in which laws are
682 read at the level of some nation states which are
683binding on individual citizens and state and non-
684state agencies.
685In addition to Conventions, the membership of
686international bodies such as UNESCO and the
687Council of Europe may also adopt Resolutions,
688which have much less legal force than
689a Convention but nevertheless provide guidance
690as to norms and expectations. These too are not
691binding upon individual and state and non-state
692agencies unless their provisions are adopted into
693national law, but they may also provide the basis
694on which future Conventions are constructed.
695Other international organizations also contribute
696to international law in this area, in a more sub-
697stantive manner. The European Union is
698concerned primarily with economic and political
699issues, leaving matters of culture to the broader
700membership of the Council of Europe, but recent
701changes in the EU have allowed it to consider
702cultural matters, and these may become more
703significant as time moves on. However, as part
704of its economic remit, it brought forward in 1992
705two legal instruments relating to the movement of
706cultural items into and out of the EU and between
707member states. The terms of the Directive on the
708Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed
709from the Territory of a Member State will need to
710be incorporated into national laws before it takes
711full effect, but this must be done to a set timeta-
712ble; the Regulation on the export of cultural
713goods – which places limitations on the export
714of such items outside the EU – had immediate and
715direct effect on member states and their citizens.
716Like all legislative arrangements, some inter-
717national instruments purport to relate to all
718aspects of heritage, such as the UNESCO World
719Heritage Convention, the European Cultural
720Convention, and the OAS Convention. Others
721concern all matters relating to particular types
722of heritage object, such as the RAMSAR Con-
723vention on Wetlands, the European Conventions
724which separately treat the archaeological and
725architectural heritage, and the UNESCOConven-
726tions on underwater and intangible heritages.
727Others attempt to address particular issues that
728affect cultural objects, such as the UNESCO
729Hague and Paris Conventions, the UNIDROIT
730Convention, and the European Union measures
L 8 Legislation in Archaeology: Overview and Introduction
Comp. by: SSARATHKUMAR Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 276 Title Name: EGA
Date:27/4/13 Time:17:21:04 Page Number: 9
731 in relation to the movement of cultural objects.
732 The Paris and UNIDROIT Conventions and the
733 EUmeasures all relate in particular to the issue of
734 the illicit acquisition, movement, and transfer of
735 cultural objects from one state to another:
736 whereas most international law seeks to provide
737 guidance and to set standards, these measures
738 endeavor to go further by regulating behavior.
739 In this way they are acting much more like
740 national laws.
741 Not all states choose to accede to all interna-
742 tional laws in this field. In some cases it will be
743 because they consider they lack the resources to
744 meet the standards required by that law; in
745 others – particularly developed states in the
746 West – that they already have laws and mecha-
747 nisms in place that meet or surpass those of the
748 particular instrument. In some cases it may be felt
749 that the particular instrument – although perhaps
750 introduced by the state in question – is aimed at
751 the practices of other states who do not meet the
752 standard set. In others it will be because it chal-
753 lenges or threatens a particular national interest,
754 such as an economic interest. Failures to accede
755 inevitably weaken the effect of such laws since
756 they cannot be enforced against states that have
757 not done so. In turn this may affect the capacity of
758 the instrument to act as a measure of minimum
759 performance and an international standard. At the
760 same time, such laws have been criticized for
761 adopting a specifically Western approach to
762 ideas of cultural heritage, constructed around
763 notions of the built and monumental heritage,
764 rather than heritages of practice and belief. Such
765 criticisms have led to a refocusing especially by
766 UNESCO on such ideas as the “intangible heri-
767 tage” and “cultural diversity,” reflected in instru-
768 ments promulgated in the early part of this
769 century. These represent new approaches to the
770 cultural heritage which can be expected to have
771 influence at the level of the nation state, although
772 not all Western states have yet acceded to these
773 new principles.
774 National Laws and Their Differences
775 Although references in the literature of the field
776 to international measures are extensive and such
777 laws are invariably treated in the literature of the
778field as significantly influential (e.g., Cleere
7791989; Skeates 2000; Carman 2002; Smith 2004:
780106), nevertheless attempts to assess their effect
781on law and practice at the key level of the nation
782state are limited. A project by the Council of
783Europe nevertheless attempted to do this for the
784European Conventions relating to the archaeo-
785logical and architectural heritage, by a process
786of comparison of how different states put the
787requirements of the Conventions into effect
788(Pickard 2001). As would possibly be expected,
789the range of 13 countries from all parts of
790Europe – some well established, others newly
791emergent – provided evidence of a wide diversity
792of treatment, organization, and focus together
793with different levels of compliance with the Con-
794ventions. The project focused in particular on the
795following aspects of heritage management in
796each territory:
797• Definition of the heritage, including systems
798of categorization and selection criteria
799• Processes of identification and styles of inven-
800tories and recording
801• Measures to protect, preserve, and prevent
802damage
803• Conservation philosophy, including attitudes
804to reconstruction and refurbishment
805• Sanctions for breach of regulations and coer-
806cive measures in place
807• Integration of conservation with other plan-
808ning and land-use regulation
809• Financial provisions, including sources of
810funding, tax regimes, and economic develop-
811ment programs
812• The role and structure of relevant agencies and
813organizations
814• Provision for the education and training of
815staff
816The discussion usefully highlights differences
817between individual countries but also indicates
818areas few or none have yet addressed, pointing to
819the future influence likely to be wielded by
820regional rather than purely national approaches
821(Pickard 2001: 4-10). Here, I wish to outline the
822areas where legislative provisions can take
823a different approach in different parts of the
824world. These areas are in particular:
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825 • Ways of defining and specifying the object of
826 such laws
827 • How different bodies of material are
828 addressed in laws
829 • Issues of rights of ownership and control
830 • The kinds of sanctions which may be applied
831 Depending on the system of law in place, the
832 approach taken in these areas will correlate quite
833 closely.
834 Defining and Specifying Material
835 There are several ways in which the material
836 covered by a law or a body of law may be
837 described, set out by Prott and O’Keefe (1984:
838 184-187) as enumeration, categorization, and
839 classification. Enumeration is a system of lists
840 of the kinds of material to be covered: this is
841 typical of US federal laws in this area (US Dept.
842 of the Interior 1989-90) and has been to some
843 extent adopted in the UK for the purpose of
844 describing the kinds of objects that can be con-
845 sidered for the purposes of legal protection
846 (Carman 1996: 120-124 & 187-192). The prob-
847 lem with this approach is that it leaves open the
848 question of whether items not on the list but of
849 a similar kind can be included: for example, if the
850 list specifies “graves and burial sites,” does this
851 also cover aboveground disposal of the dead?
852 Categorization is a looser approach whereby
853 a broad description of types of material is pro-
854 vided, into which a range of particular objects
855 may fall. The problem of this approach is that
856 too narrow a definition may exclude objects of
857 concern, while too broad a definition may include
858 too much material. By contrast with both, classi-
859 fication is not concerned with the form of the
860 object, but with actions taken towards it: in such
861 a system, only those objects officially recognized
862 and designated as such by a responsible authority
863 can be granted protection. While convenient and
864 transparent, the system has the flaw of only rec-
865 ognizing those objects that have been specifically
866 designated, leaving others of similar nature to
867 their fate. At the same time, it is worth noting
868 that these different systems are by no means
869 exclusive. It is possible to use them in combina-
870 tion, so that the list under an enumerative scheme
871 may include categories, while a scheme of
872categorization may also enumerate particular
873types of object, and a classificatory scheme may
874operate in respect of items enumerated or
875categorized.
876These differences represent contrasting
877approaches to the cultural heritage as
878a phenomenon as well as the structure of law.
879Where only designated material is covered by
880law, the emphasis is placed upon the relevant
881authority and its decisions; where material is
882enumerated, anything included is automatically
883covered, removing authority from agencies and
884placing it more generally; under schemes of cat-
885egorization, a measure of interpretation is
886required, placing some but not all focus upon
887agencies. An enumerative scheme assumes
888a solid understanding of the kinds of materials
889and places constituting the heritage: by its nature,
890anything not listed is excluded. A scheme of
891categorization has a greater capacity for the
892inclusion of new types of material, especially if
893the categories are drawn not on the basis of phys-
894ical form or attributes (e.g., state of ruination or
895age) but on value ascriptions (e.g., “of architec-
896tural, archaeological, etc., interest or impor-
897tance”). Paradoxically, the greatest flexibility
898may exist under a scheme of designation, so
899long as the capacity to designate is drawn widely:
900if it is limited by enumeration or categorization,
901then it is significantly less able to include new
902types of material.
903Addressing Different Bodies of Material
904The range of objects that can be classed as cul-
905tural resources is wide, ranging from individual
906moveable objects singly or in groups; to upstand-
907ing buildings in use, ruined buildings and struc-
908tures, earthwork sites, buried features, scatters of
909material, and natural features used by humans; to
910entire landscapes, built and natural (Carman
9112002: 30-57). Under systems of law, the ways of
912treating them may be as varied as the material
913itself. In some regimes, all cultural material of
914whatever kind is treated under the same body of
915law: while different objects may be treated in
916particular ways, the overall scheme is common
917to all classes of material. By contrast, others
918make a clear distinction between particular
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919 kinds of object, so they are not only treated dif-
920 ferently but are also subject to different bodies of
921 law. In those cases where a single, overarching
922 national antiquities law covers all cultural
923 objects, no distinction is drawn between individ-
924 ual bodies of material. Regardless of whether the
925 object is a moveable object, a scatter of material,
926 a ruin or a buried feature, an upstanding building,
927 or a landscape, it will be subject to the same
928 regime, effectively rendering them all a single
929 class of object for legal purposes.
930 By contrast, other regimes make a clear dis-
931 tinction between particular kinds of object, so
932 they are not only treated differently but are also
933 subject to different bodies of law. Distinctions
934 may be drawn on the basis of the physical prop-
935 erties or attributes of the material, so that move-
936 able objects are differentiated from fixed
937 monuments and sites, and the latter perhaps
938 from upstanding buildings in use. While move-
939 able objects are subject to laws concerning own-
940 ership and their placement in museums or other
941 archives, fixed sites and monuments may be sub-
942 ject to official protection in the care of the state,
943 while buildings in use are subject to controls on
944 use and alteration. Alternatively, distinctions
945 may be drawn on the basis of whose heritage
946 the object represents: in states where an indige-
947 nous population may claim rights over its cultural
948 material, such as the Americas or Australia, such
949 material will be treated differently from the his-
950 toric heritage of the incoming European popula-
951 tion. Here, a distinction between prehistoric (i.e.,
952 pre-European contact) material and historic
953 (colonial period) material is effectively drawn:
954 but it is in fact not a distinction based upon age
955 but upon putative cultural origin. European
956 states – except those where an indigenous popu-
957 lation dwells, such as in northern Scandinavia
958 and Russia – and numbers of states in Africa
959 and Asia (although not all), generally have no
960 need of such a distinction, and material of all
961 periods is capable of treatment under the same
962 regime, although distinctions between different
963 types of object may also be maintained.
964Ownership Versus Control
965As Prott & O’Keefe (1984: 189) point out, “it is
966not usually necessary to have ownership of
967[material] in order to regulate what may be done
968in relation to it.” Nevertheless, as they go on to
969add (Prott & O’Keefe 1984: 191), a number of
970states across the globe do claim a right of owner-
971ship of certain classes of cultural material from
972the moment of discovery. While in most cases
973this right of ownership applies only to removable
974material – which will most likely find its way into
975a museum or archive – in some cases it applies
976also to the land on which they were found
977(Prott & O’Keefe 1984: 195). Alternatively,
978material and land may become subject to
979compulsory acquisition by the state unless certain
980conditions (such as the deposition of material in
981a suitable archive) are met. This “nationalization”
982of the cultural heritage has a number of
983advantages:
984• It is a coherent and transparent process applied
985equally to all.
986• It ensures full control by appropriate agencies
987over the fate of material.
988• It associates suchmaterial with the entire com-
989munity as represented by the nation state.
990• It is simple.
991However, it rides roughshod over private
992rights and may encourage finders to fail to report
993or record finds.
994An alternative to state ownership is to provide
995for the regulation of the treatment of cultural
996material while allowing private ownership of
997that material. This may involve drawing distinc-
998tions between material on the basis of its type and
999circumstances of discovery so that some material
1000is the property of the state, while other material of
1001similar kind is not: this is the case, for instance,
1002with the laws of Treasure Trove and Treasure in
1003England (Carman 1996: 55-61; Bland 2004).
1004Alternatively, the “cultural” component of the
1005material may become controlled by state agen-
1006cies, while the object itself remains the property
1007of another: this is sometimes the case with
1008upstanding monuments, where the land on
1009which it stands and in which it is rooted remains
1010the property of the landowner, but the monument
1011passes into state control; in such cases, the
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1012 landowner continues to have use of the land but is
1013 subject to limitations on treatment of the monu-
1014 ment. A third way is to place controls on the use
1015 of land either to prevent damage to existing
1016 archaeology or such that the presence of archae-
1017 ology is so far as possible taken into account
1018 before the discovery of cultural material: deci-
1019 sions regarding the fate of any such material will
1020 therefore have been taken before any work com-
1021 mences, and where significant material is to be
1022 encountered, work likely to damage it may be
1023 completely prevented. In cases such as these,
1024 laws and administrative arrangements to put
1025 them into force will be more complex and poten-
1026 tially more costly but if effective can develop
1027 a measure of public support for the project of
1028 cultural heritage protection, limiting the prob-
1029 lems of avoidance.
1030 Public and Private Agencies
1031 The role of state agencies will differ whether the
1032 laws provide for state ownership or state controls
1033 on private ownership of cultural material. In the
1034 first case, all authority over cultural remains will
1035 lie with the state. In the second, state agencies
1036 will need to interact and compromise with others
1037 who retain an interest in the material.
1038 By far the most common approach is that of
1039 central regulation by state control, in which her-
1040 itage objects are deemed to be the property and
1041 thus the responsibility of the nation state and its
1042 agencies. Under such a system, only those
1043 accredited by the state – frequently its employees
1044 but also those granted specific licences – are
1045 entitled to conduct archaeological or conserva-
1046 tion work. Accordingly, excavation by anyone
1047 else is commonly a criminal activity. In theory
1048 at least, all building and other work will cease
1049 when archaeological remains are encountered
1050 and state-employed archaeologists will move
1051 onto the site. In practice, however, limitations
1052 apply on this potentially draconian system.
1053 Small developments will be allowed to proceed
1054 unhindered, government-sponsored projects may
1055 also proceed without the interference of an
1056 archaeologist, and, in many countries where
1057 such systems apply, lack of resources will result
1058 in incomplete coverage. Nevertheless, the ideal
1059of such a system is a very powerful idea and
1060dominates much thinking in the heritage field. It
1061is the ideal assumed to exist by most international
1062agencies such as UNESCO, and very often those
1063territories or areas not applying this approach can
1064be thought to be deficient. Here, archaeology is
1065a cost carried out of taxation levied on the entire
1066community in whose service it is deemed to exist.
1067The alternative system, which applies mostly
1068in Anglophone countries such as the UK, USA,
1069and Australia, is that of a partially privatized
1070archaeology. This is essentially a private enter-
1071prise system under a measure of regulation by
1072state and state-empowered authorities. In general
1073there will be no limitation on who may carry out
1074archaeological work, although professional bod-
1075ies will seek to encourage the employment of
1076those accredited by them. Excavation itself will
1077most often be carried out as a result of the need to
1078mitigate the damage of archaeological remains
1079by development projects. In the USA material
1080of “scientific significance” may need to be
1081retrieved or preserved; in the UK, the emphasis
1082is theoretically upon preservation in situ but fre-
1083quently results in rescue excavation and so-called
1084preservation by record.Where development work
1085reveals archaeological remains, the developer
1086will be responsible for employing archaeologists
1087to carry out appropriate work, monitored by the
1088local authority to ensure proper standards of
1089recording. Here, archaeology is a cost levied on
1090the developer, treating damage to the heritage as
1091a form of pollution and applying the principle of
1092“the polluter pays” for restitution. This is archae-
1093ology as enterprise, although never completely
1094unregulated, and much of the discussion of such
1095systems turns upon issues of regulation and con-
1096trol rather than freedom of action.
1097Sanctions and Penalties
1098There are two aspects to the issue of sanctions
1099and penalties applied for breach of laws relating
1100to the archaeological resource: to what kinds of
1101offences they relate and the types of sanction
1102applied. Depending on the kind of regime in
1103place – a state-ownership regime or
1104a “privatized” regime – particular attitudes as to
1105the severity of breach and what types of breach
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1106 are more serious will prevail, reflected in the
1107 sanctions applied both theoretically and in prac-
1108 tice. The range of sanctions available runs the full
1109 scale of penalties for breach of any kind of law:
1110 from prison terms through fines where breach is
1111 considered a criminal matter to civil remedies
1112 such as damages and carrying the cost of restora-
1113 tion and repair and the confiscation of material.
1114 Such penalties may be combined so that a person
1115 in breach may have to carry out reparation and
1116 pay a fine or serve a prison term. As Pickard
1117 (2001: 329) points out, however, such powerful
1118 sanctions tend not to be applied: prosecutionsmay
1119 be rare and the penalties awarded relatively light.
1120 Where archaeological material is held to be
1121 the property of the state, criminal sanctions are
1122 more likely to apply to those who claim it for
1123 themselves. It is frequently a breach of criminal
1124 law to export such material without the proper
1125 authority, and sometimes any private appropria-
1126 tion of such material will be considered a form
1127 of theft. In some territories, although private
1128 ownership is allowed, penalties apply for the
1129 non-reporting of finds (Prott & O’Keefe 1984:
1130 209-10 & 215-216). An alternative is to reward
1131 finders for reporting: they may be allowed to
1132 retain the find without penalty, or receive pay-
1133 ment for its delivery to a suitable repository.
1134 Where private ownership of material is the
1135 accepted norm, specific provisions may apply to
1136 particular classes of material – either on the basis
1137 of its attributes, such as its form or material, or on
1138 the basis of its context of discovery, such as its
1139 location when found, or the process by which it
1140 came to light. Accordingly, for the bulk of
1141 archaeological material, normal rules for the
1142 allocation of ownership will apply, but certain
1143 material may become the property of the state.
1144 In such cases a need to report may apply to all
1145 material or only that owned by the state: in the
1146 latter case, provision may nevertheless be made
1147 for the voluntary reporting of finds.
1148 Penalties also accrue to those who may dam-
1149 age or destroy archaeological sites and monu-
1150 ments and historic buildings. In some cases,
1151 where these are owned by or in the care of the
1152 state, the penalties will be criminal, involving
1153 fine or prison. In other cases they will be civil,
1154such as reparation or damages. Where arrange-
1155ments are in place for the control of construction
1156and development work, archaeological remains
1157may be included among those factors to be con-
1158sidered. In such a case, where the likelihood of
1159damage to archaeological remains is envisaged,
1160the proposed work may be prevented altogether
1161but is more likely to have controls placed upon it:
1162for redesign to avoid affecting significant archae-
1163ological material, or for advance investigation of
1164such material at the cost of the developer. Failure
1165to comply may result in a fine or the imposition of
1166further controls on development work. In similar
1167vein, some Latin American states may apply
1168sanctions to unsatisfactory excavators for poor
1169quality archaeological work (Prott & O’Keefe
11701984: 305): such penalties will involve the can-
1171cellation of licences to conduct work in the terri-
1172tory concerned.
1173Conclusion
1174It is likely that the kinds of differences between
1175national laws outlined briefly here in some way
1176correlate. Accordingly, where a single body of
1177law applies to all cultural objects, they may also
1178be subject to direct state ownership and control,
1179allow for no non-state agency involvement, and
1180apply at least theoretically strict criminal sanc-
1181tions. Where distinctions are made between types
1182of object, different ownership regimes may exist
1183side by side, there may be a measure of non-state
1184involvement in archaeology, and sanctions may
1185be relatively light and civil rather than criminal.
1186To date, however, and despite the work of Prott &
1187O’Keefe (1984) and others (e.g., heritagelaw.
1188org), no substantial work of this nature has yet
1189been completed, so these suggested likely corre-
1190lations remain only as plausible assertions.
1191Nevertheless, whether or not these types of cor-
1192relations exist in reality, the crucial point is that
1193differences between legal regimes are not mere
1194matters of administrative convenience: in the
1195same way as the differences of legal interpreta-
1196tion covered above, they represent fundamental
1197differences of ideology in terms of what law is
1198for, where authority resides, and the nature of the
1199cultural heritage. In thus approaching national
1200laws, it is necessary to be sensitive to the kinds
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1201 of ideology represented and the attitudes towards
1202 and expectations of both law and heritage they
1203 carry.
1204 The Professionalization of Archaeology
1205 The application of legislation in the field of
1206 archaeology and its regulation under law is one
1207 of the factors that has encouraged the increasing
1208 professionalization of the field. The regulatory
1209 influence of official organizations allows them
1210 to produce standard-setting documentation
1211 which influence practice and require to be met if
1212 work is to be granted to those at whom they are
1213 aimed: a number of state agencies accordingly
1214 have adopted such a nonlegislative approach
1215 to controls on archaeological work. Parks
1216 Canada, for instance, publish as part of their
1217 website (http://parkscanada.pch.gc.ca/library/
1218 PC_Guiding_Principles/) their Cultural
1219 Resource Management Policy setting out the
1220 principles guiding their treatment of the historic
1221 places in their care. In the UK, English Heritage
1222 seek to guide the conduct of publicly funded
1223 archaeological work by encouraging a particular
1224 managerial approach (English Heritage 1991).
1225 English Heritage were also responsible for pro-
1226 ducing the nationally applicable guidelines for
1227 local authorities on the treatment of archaeolog-
1228 ical sites under threat from development projects
1229 (DoE 1990), and their application and effective-
1230 ness is monitored by them. The message of such
1231 products – whether international or national – is
1232 that of the particular expertise of the people
1233 responsible for them, which in turn further
1234 encourages the professionalization of the disci-
1235 pline as a whole.
1236 In combination with laws and regulatory pro-
1237 cedures, systems of self-supervision and over-
1238 sight create a climate where archaeology
1239 operates inevitably as part of systems of gover-
1240 nance. Although not widely discussed in these
1241 terms (but see Smith 2004: 58-80), the point is
1242 recognized by others with an interest in the mate-
1243 rial remains of the past. Especially in those juris-
1244 dictions governed by a tradition of Common Law
1245 and private property rather than state control and
1246 ownership, those who object to giving control
1247 over the past to a “closed” profession, and despite
1248their own inclination towards individualism,
1249organize themselves into groups who may then
1250propagate their own codes of practice and stan-
1251dards of behavior, effectively “professionalizing”
1252an anti-archaeologist stance. This is to some
1253extent the situation in the UK in respect of ama-
1254teur metal detectors and treasure hunters, many
1255of whom work in association with archaeologists
1256and others. The voluntary Portable Antiquities
1257Scheme – whereby finds are reported and the
1258information made publicly available (www.
1259finds.org.uk; Bland 2004) – is given support by
1260the code of practice of the National Council for
1261Metal Detecting (www.ncmd.co.uk) among
1262others.
1263Conclusion
1264The key points to note from this overview of law
1265and regulation in archaeology are the variations
1266in approaches to law in the field: these in turn
1267represent not mere habit and local practice but
1268real differences in ideology and approach. Where
1269a system is based upon close control by central
1270government, it represents a very different under-
1271standing of the purpose and role of archaeology in
1272society from one where private ownership is
1273upheld and regulations are looser and more flex-
1274ible. These are differences that matter, especially
1275in relation to study or work in an area new to one:
1276ideas that are the norm in one territory do not
1277transfer simply to another. Such differences are
1278reflected in how archaeologists are trained and
1279qualified, the relations between archaeologists
1280and the state, relations between archaeologists,
1281between archaeologists and others interested in
1282the past, and between archaeologists and the
1283wider public.
1284Cross-References
1285▶African Continent, Archaeological Heritage
1286Management Law on the
1287▶Athens Charter (1931)
1288▶Australia, Domestic Archaeological and
1289Heritage Management Law in
1290▶Australia, Indigenous Cultural Property
1291Return in
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1292 ▶Burra Charter (1999)
1293 ▶Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns
1294 and Urban Areas (1987)
1295 ▶Charter for the Protection and Management of
1296 the Archaeological Heritage (1990)
1297 ▶Charter for the Protection and Management of
1298 the Underwater Cultural Heritage (1996)
1299 ▶China, Domestic Archaeological Heritage
1300 Management Law in
1301 ▶Conservation and Management of
1302 Archaeological Sites (Legislation)
1303 ▶Continental Europe, Domestic Archaeological
1304 and Heritage Management Law in
1305 ▶Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible
1306 Cultural Heritage (2003)
1307 ▶Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
1308 Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
1309 Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
1310 (1970)
1311 ▶Convention on the Protection of the
1312 Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001)
1313 ▶Council of Europe Framework Convention on
1314 the Value of Cultural Heritage and Society
1315 (2005)
1316 ▶Cultural Property Protection during Wartime:
1317 The Second Gulf War (US/Iraq)
1318 ▶Cultural Property Repatriation and Restitution:
1319 Relevant Rules of International Law
1320 ▶Cultural Property Repatriation in the United
1321 States: A Case Study in NAGPRA (US)
1322 ▶Cultural Property, Trade and Trafficking:
1323 Introduction
1324 ▶European Convention on the Protection of
1325 Archaeological Heritage (1996)
1326 ▶European Union Directive 9311/92: Export of
1327 Cultural Goods
1328 ▶ Florence Charter: Historic Gardens (1982)
1329 ▶Hague Convention for the Protection of
1330 Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
1331 Conflict (1954)
1332 ▶ ICOMOS Charter on Cultural Routes
1333 ▶ International Charter for the Conservation and
1334 Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Venice
1335 1964)
1336 ▶ International Council of Museums (ICOM):
1337 Code of Ethics
1338▶ International Cultural Tourism Charter
1339Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage
1340Significance (1999)
1341▶ International Journal of Cultural Property
1342▶Latin America, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in
1343▶Legislation in Archaeology: Overview and
1344Introduction
1345▶Machu Picchu Artifacts, Repatriation of the
1346▶Museum Security Network
1347▶Norms of Quito (1967)
1348▶ Parthenon (Elgin) Marbles, Case Study of
1349▶United Nations Educational, Scientific and
1350Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World
1351Heritage Convention
1352▶ International Institute for the Unification of
1353Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on
1354Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
1355(1995)
1356▶United States Domestic Archaeological
1357Heritage Management Law
1358▶USA and Mexico (1970): Bilateral Treaties
1359and Patrimonial Property Restitution
1360▶Vermillion Accord on Human Remains
1361(Legislation)
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t1:1 Legislation in Archaeology: Overview and Introduction, Table 1 Main international instruments relating to the
cultural heritage
Date Promoted by (international organization) Titlet1:2
1954 UNESCO (portal.unesco.org) Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(Hague Convention)t1:3
1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Cultural Property (Paris
Convention)t1:4
1972 Convention concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritaget1:5
2001 Convention on the Protection of the
Underwater Cultural Heritaget1:6
2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the
Intangible Cultural Heritaget1:7
2005 Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressionst1:8
1971 RAMSAR (www.ramsar.org) RAMSAR Convention on Wetlandst1:9
1995 UNIDROIT (www.unidroit.org) Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objectst1:10
1954 Council of Europe (www.coe.int) European Cultural Conventiont1:11
1969 (revised 1992) European Convention on the Protection
of the Archaeological Heritaget1:12
1985 European Convention on Offences
Relating to Cultural Propertyt1:13
Convention for the Protection of the
Architectural Heritage of Europet1:14
1976 Organization of American States (www.oas.org) Convention on Protection of the
Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic
Heritage of the American Nationst1:15
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